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STATE OF UTAH 
DANNY PETTY, z 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : 
vs. : 
: 
R.V. SALES, INC., dba : Case No. 870149 
PLAZA CYCLE, : 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appeal from order of the Honorable Michael Murphy, Dis-
trict Judge, denying Appellant's appeal from an order of the Cir-
cuit Court which refused to vacate a default judgment unsupported 
by evidence. 
DISPOSITION OF CASE IN LOWER COURT 
The District Court, by Order dated 21 July 1987, af-
firmed the ruling of the lower court which denied Appellant's 
motion to vacate default judgment. 
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT 
Appellant asks this Court to rule: 
1. That the Circuit Court order refusing to vacate the 
default judgment should be vacated. 
2. That the Circuit Court be instructed to provide a 
hearing wherein evidence is submitted for the purpose of deter-
mining Plaintiff's actual damages. 
3. In the alternative, but not as an exclusion of the 
above reliefr Appellant requests that the order of the Circuit 
Court denying Defendant's motion to vacate default judgment be 
reversed, for the reason that the Circuit Court abused its dis-
cretion in denying the motion for the reason that Appellant's 
failure to timely respond to Plaintiff's complaint was due to ex-
cusable neglect within the meaning of Rule 60(b) URCP. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about November 1984, Plaintiff brought a motor-
cycle engine and a motorcycle to Defendant's shop in West Valley 
City. Plaintiff alleges that he asked to have the engine in-
spected and placed in good working order. 
The claim of Plaintiff that Defendant agreed to inspect 
the engine, oil system and place it in "good working order" is 
false. Defendant has recovered a copy of the invoice from the 
West Valley Police, made by Defendant (this invoice was unavail-
able at the time of the motion to vacate default judgment). The 
invoice signed by Plaintiff indicated that Defendant was only to 
check for some "motor noise," See copy of invoice attached. 
After the work was completed, Plaintiff alleges that he 
drove the motorcycle a distance of roughly fifty miles after 
which the engine failed. Plaintiff returned the bike to Defen-
dant for repairs. Plaintiff told Defendant that Plaintiff would 
provide the parts on a piecemeal basis. 
No claim of faulty workmanship was made by Plaintiff at 
this time. Plaintiff left his motorcycle in Defendant's shop. 
Defendant performed repairs as the parts were brought in by 
Plaintiff. Plaintiff was so slow in bringing the parts in that 
Defendant, on several occasions, requested Plaintiff to remove 
this bike. 
Plaintiff came to Defendant's business on or about 28 
April 1985 wherein he menaced Defendant's emplpoyees with a base-
ball bat, threatened Defendant and shouted obscenities to Defen-
dant's customers. The West Valley Police had to be summoned to 
quell the disturbance. 
Plaintiff filed suit in Murray Circuit Court on or 
about 16 June 1986 alleging Defendant negligently failed to in-
spect the oil system in the engine of Plaintiff's motorcycle. 
Plaintiff alleged that Defendant's negligence resulted in damages 
to his motorcycle engine. Plaintiff requested an award of 
damages in the sum of $4,957.64 for reasonable value of repairs 
and reasonable value of loss of use of his motorcycle. 
Defendant did not answer the complaint within the twen-
ty days. Plaintiff obtained a default judgment against Defendant 
on application to the Clerk of the Court twenty-two days after 
the summons was served on Defendant. 
Defendant moved to vacate the judgment with affidavits 
and argument. The motion was denied. 
Defendant appealed from the rulings denying its motion 
to vacate the default judgment. The District Court, by minute 
entry dated 13 March 1987, denied Defendant's motion to vacate 
default judgment* 
POINTS RAISED ON APPEAL 
I 
PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO A JUDGMENT CONTAINING 
DAMAGED UNSUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE 
II 
DEFENDANT'S FAILURE TO ANSWER THE COMPLAINT WITHIN 
TWENTY DAYS WAS EXCUSABLE WITHIN THE MEANING 
OF RULE 60(b) URCP 
III 
THE FAILURE TO SET ASIDE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT BY 
THE CIRCUIT COURT CONSTITUTES AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO A JUDGMENT CONTAINING 
DAMAGED UNSUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE 
Plaintiff was awarded a default judgment by the Murray 
Circuit Clerk for alleged reasonable value of repairs and alleged 
reasonable value of loss of use of his motorcycle in the sum of 
$4,957.64. No evidence was submitted to support an award of this 
amount. The judgment was entered on the bare allegations in the 
complaint. 
Did Plaintiff have his motorcycle repaired by a repair 
shop? What were the repairs? How much was paid? How was the 
loss of use amount established? What if Plaintiff claimed dam-
ages in the amount of one million dollars for repairs and one and 
one-half millions dollars for loss of use? Would a judgment in 
this amount be .upheld without supporting evidence? 
Rule 55(b)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure pro-
vides that judgment by default may be entered by the Clerk of the 
4 
Court where the claim is for a sum certain or for a sum which can 
be made certain by computation* 
Rule 55(b)(2) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides 
that: 
"In all other cases, the party entitled to a judgment 
by default shall apply to the Court therefore. If in 
order to enable the Court to enter judgment ... it is 
necessary to ... determine the amount of damages or to 
establish the truth of any averment by evidence ... the 
Court may conduct such hearings or order such refer-
ences as it deems necessary." (Emphasis added.) 
The case of Pitts v .Pine Meadow Ranch, 589 P2d 767 
(Utah 1978) applied the principle. Plaintiffs alleged that some 
real property had been damaged and some trees destroyed. Plain-
tiffs offered no more than bare allegations as to damages and the 
value of the property and the trees. The Court found that there 
was insufficient evidence to support the default judgment. 
Hurd v. Ford, 74 Ut 46. 55 (1929) dealt with a default 
judgment for alleged "reasonable attorney's fees." The Court 
found a claim for reasonable attorney's fees to be not for a sum 
certain. The Court vacated the default judgment as being irregu-
larly entered. 
The claim of Plaintiff for damages for reasonable value 
of repairs and reasonable value of loss of use in this case is 
similarly uncertain. Evidence is necessary to support a judgment 
for alleged loss of use and alleged value of repairs. The judg-
ment entered by the clerk for damages of $4,957.64 should be 
vacated as being-irregularly entered. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT'S FAILURE TO ANSWER THE COMPLAINT WITHIN 
TWENTY DAYS WAS EXCUSABLE WITHIN THE MEANING 
OF RULE 60(b) URCP 
A, Principles Applicable 
"Judgments by default are not favored by the Courts nor 
are they in the interest of justice and fair play. No one has an 
inalienable or constitutional right to a judgment by default 
without a hearing on the merits* The Courts, in the interest of 
justice and fair play, favor, where possible, a full and complete 
opportunity for a hearing on the merits of every case." Heath-
man V, Fabian & Clendenin, 377 P2d 189, 190 Utah (1962). The 
Utah Supreme Court has also stated that, while defaults are gen-
erally not favored, this is especially true where challenging 
pleadings were timely filed. Interstate Excavating v. Agla De-
velopment, 611 P2d 369, 371 Utah (1980). The policy is clear and 
the spirit of that policy has been codified in Rule 60(b) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. This rule reads, in pertinent 
part: 
"On motion and upon such terms as are just, the Court 
may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or 
his legal representative from a final judgment, order 
or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect ... or any 
other reason justifying relief from the operation of a 
judgment." 
Rule 60(b) goes on to say that the motion to vacate 
must be made within three months after the judgment was entered. 
There is no dispute that Defendants motion to vacate was made 
within the time prescribed by statute. It is important to note 
that the language of the statue stresses consideration of equity. 
An application to set aside is equitable in nature and is addres-
sed to the conscience of the Court. Olsen v. Cummings, 565 P2d 
1124, Utah (1977). The Utah Supreme Court has noted on several 
occasions that relief in close cases should be granted and indul-
gence shown toward Defendant in order to allow a full inquiry 
into the matter. 
Board of Education of Granite School District v. Coxy 
384 P2d, 806, 807 Utah (1963). 
Heath v. Mower, 597 P2d 855, 858 Utah (1979). 
Pitts v. Pine Meadow Ranch, Inc., 589 P2d 767, 768 Utah 
(1978). 
Olsen supra at 1124. 
Helgesen v. Inyangumia, 636 P2d 1079, 1081 Utah (1981)* 
Although no general rule can be set down, discretion should al-
ways be exercised as to promote the ends of justice. Heath, 
supra at 858, Helgesen, supra at 1080. 
The interest of justice is served by allowing the case 
to be heard on its merits. Plaintiff is not harmed by having the 
merits of the case tested. If his case is right, he will win. 
If he is wrong, he will be deprived of a judgment to which he is 
not entitled, i.e., the ends of justice will be served. 
B. Excusable Mistake Applied to Facts of this Case. 
The summons and complaint from Plaintiff were original-
ly served on Plaza Cycle at its place of business. Defendant 
then sent the summons and complaint to its attorney who had been 
away at Army training at Fort Carson. Upon his return. Defen-
dant's attorney was faced with a delay of accumulated mail, in-
cluding this item. Defendant's attonrey's work for Defendant 
consists almost exclusively of collection suits. Defendants 
attorney examined the accumulated mail and segregated it accord-
ing to the immediacy of attention it needed. The complaint of 
Plaintiff was with papers pertaining to collection suits. Defen-
dant's attorney, thinking all the papers pertained to collection 
suits, placed the envelope with lower-priority accumulated mail. 
Defendant's attorney only became award of the suit of 
Plaintiff when he received notification of the entry of judgment. 
The judgment had been entered 22 days after service of the com-
plaint. The judgment was entered by the Murray Circuit Court 
Clerk for $4,991.64 which was the amount of damages alleged by 
Plaintiff. No evidence of the damages was submitted. 
Defendant's attorney attempted to contact Plaintiff's 
attorney by telephone and left messages. There was no response 
to the telephone messages. 
After receiving no response to his urgent messages to 
Plaintiff's attorney, Defendant, on 19 February 1986, filed a 
motion to vacate the default judgment. Accompanying affidavits 
explained the mistake and set forth meritorious defenses known at 
that time and Defendant presented to the Court the principle 
(with authorities) that a default judgment containing damages un-
supported by evidence should not be allowed. 
Defendant's motions were denied. 
In its opinions on this issue, the Utah Supreme Court 
has drawn a distinction between willfull failure to file a timely 
answer and genuine mistake. Where the Court determines that De-
fendant's failure to file was a result of indifference or was 
purely deliberate, relief from a default judgment has been denied. 
Board of Education of Granite School District, supra at 807 and 
Russell v, Martell, 681 P2d 486, 487 Utah (1984), J.P.W. Enter-
prises, Inc. v. Naef, 604 P2d 486, 487 Utah (1979), Gardiner and 
Gardiner Builders v. Swapp, 656 P2d, 1126, 1127 Utah (1982), Pit-
man v. Bonham, 677 P2d 1126, 1127 Utah (1984). In the Naef case, 
the Defendant failed to hire an attorney, failed to deliver the 
complaint to the attorney, and failed to take any other action on 
the matter. Id. In the Swapp case, the Defendant neglected to 
communicate with his attorney for over a year and a half. In the 
Pitman case, the matter was neglected by the party for two years. 
Id. Defendant's failure to timely file in the instant case was 
neither deliberate nor a result of indifference. Upon discover-
ing the error, Defendant's attorney did everything he could to 
remedy the situation by the immediate filing of an answer and a 
motion to vacate. 
An accumulation of mail occurred because Defendant's 
attorney was required to be away from the office for Army train-
ing. The backlog of mail caused the failure to answer within 
twenty days from service of the summons. 
The Utah Supreme Court has ruled that default judgment 
should be set aside where a party was genuinely mistaken and 
where absent such mistake default would not have occurred. May 
v. Thompson, 677 P2d, 1109, 1110 Utah (1984). This was especial-
ly true since relief was sought promptly, as in the instance 
case. ]jd. at 1111. Whether or not this was characterized as a 
mistake or as excusable neglect at the Circuit Court level is im-
material and ignores the policy consideration contained in the 
cited case law and in Rule 60(b). The ends of justice require 
the setting aside of the judgment so that the matter may be set-
tled after both parties have had their day in court. 
C. Defendant Established Meritorious Defenses 
Meritorious defenses were raised at the Circuit Court 
level. On 27 April 1985, in dealings between the parties, Plain-
tiff threatened employees of Defendant with a baseball bat. 
Criminal charges were filed and the police retained the invoice 
made up when Plaintiff originally brought in his motorcycle. 
That invoice was not available to Defendant until recently (well 
after the hearing on the motion to vacate) and had to be obtained 
from the West Valley Police department. The substance of Plain-
tiff's complaint is that Defendant failed to inspect the oil sys-
tem on Plaintiff's motorcycle. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant 
agreed that Plaintiff's motorcycle was to be "inspected and 
placed in good operating condition.* 
Plaintiff alleges that he drove the motorcycle fifty 
miles and sustained damages. Plaintiff alleges that the damages 
to his engine were due to Defendant's negligent failure to in-
spect and repair the oil system. 
The invoice clearly states that Defendant was only to 
check "engine noises." There is nothing to indicate that Defen-
dant was asked to check the oil system or to put the bike in 
total working order as Plaintiff alleges. This establishes a 
meritorious defense on behalf of Defendant. One cannot be ac-
cused of negligence for failing to do that which he was under no 
duty to do. 
i n 
The supporting affidavits explain why the work took so 
long to complete. Plaintiff refused to buy the parts necessary 
for the repairs from Defendant. Plaintiff insisted on providing 
them himself. This was done piecemeal and many parts were still 
not provided. Completion of the work was delayed and eventually 
made impossible by Plaintiff1s conduct. Such facts are a defense 
to Plaintifffs claim of loss of use and also constitute impossi-
bility of performance (due to Defendant's interference) which is 
a defense to Plaintiff's claim of breach of contract. 
POINT III 
THE FAILURE TO SET ASIDE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT BY 
THE CIRCUIT COURT CONSTITUTES AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION 
Defendant has had no opportunity to present its case. 
Plaintiff would not be harmed by having the merits of 
the case tested. 
If the reason behind default judgment is to punish a 
Defendant for a good faith mistake, then this judgment should re-
main. It is an abuse of discretion to refuse to vacate a default 
judgment where there is reasonable justification or excuse for 
Defendant's failure to appear and timely application is made to 
set it aside. Olsen, supra at 1124. Interstate Excavating, supra 
at 371. Where confusion exists, where there are affidavits al-
leging lack of notice and where there is a verified contention 
that Defendant had a defense to the action, Defendant is entitled 
to his day in court after default judgment had been taken against 
him. Security Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. West, 437 P2d 214, 215 
Utah (1968). Where there is any doubt about whether to set aside 
a default judgment, doubt should be resolved in favor of doing 
so. Interstate Excavating, supra at 181. Reasonable justifica-
tion existed and timely application to set it aside was made. 
The trial court abused its discretion. 
SUMMARY 
1. The judgment should be vacated because there is no 
supportin evidence for the damages contained therein. 
2. The judgment should be vacated because the failure 
of Defendant to answer the complaint was excusable and the ends 
of justice would be served by the case being decided on its 
merits. 
Dated this (^jfA^d^Y of August 1987. 
Stephpn L. ^ Johnston 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
Plaza Cycle 
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